



Reception of Germany's new Arctic Policy Guidelines (2024)

Introduction

In September 2024, the new German Arctic guidelines were published, which are likely to shape German Arctic policy for four to five years. This was preceded by interdepartmental coordination and a cabinet decision by the German government.¹ The very title “Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines- Germany and the Arctic in the context of the climate crisis and the “Zeitenwende” gives an initial indication that the new guidelines are part of a series of guidelines and strategy documents updated after the “Zeitenwende,”² not least the “National Security Strategy” from June 2023,³ which is referred to twice in the new guidelines.⁴ In addition to the Arctic guidelines, only two other regions are covered by the German government with their own strategy documents: China and Africa.⁵ This underlines the importance that the Federal Government attaches to the Arctic, even though Germany is not an Arctic state and, therefore, only has observer status in the Arctic Council (AC). The choice of the term “guidelines” instead of “strategy” reflects this idea as a form of de-prioritization of the subject matter, both internally and externally.

Due to the foreseeable importance of the guidelines, the most important changes to the previous guidelines are presented first. The media, scientific, and expert perception of the new guidelines is then recorded. The focus is not on the actual behaviour of the federal government.

Arctic guidelines from 2013 to 2024

How Germany has defined and understood the Arctic has changed over the course of the guidelines. For example, the first guidelines from 2013 (“Assume responsibility, seize opportunities”) put the Arctic on the German government’s agenda in strategic form for the first time. They saw the Arctic primarily as a “market” and focused on the economic potential of the Arctic. The 2013 guidelines were drafted and published solely by the then FDP-led Federal Foreign Office; there was no departmental coordination and no cabinet decision because no inter-ministerial agreement was reached at the time.

In the 2019 guidelines (“Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future”), the Arctic was presented almost exclusively as a region affected by climate change; references to the Arctic “market” are almost non-existent. Influenced by the inter-ministerial Arctic Dialogue initiated by the AWI (since 2013), the resolutions of the Paris Climate Conference (COP 21), and the first inter-ministerial coordination, the guidelines read like a “new edition,” which, now as guidelines of the Federal Government, differ greatly from the guidelines from 2013.

As a result of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Arctic is experiencing a change in significance in terms of security policy with the new 2024 guidelines, which recognize the impact of Arctic security on Germany. In principle, the Arctic population is taken into account more consistently in the Federal Government’s positions on climate, environmental, and nature conservation, research, and sustainable development than in 2019 or 2013.⁶ This “further development” of the 2019 guidelines cannot be overlooked.

Importance of the Arctic for Germany

The importance attributed to the Arctic by the German government, which prompted it to draw up Arctic guidelines in the first place, changed from 2013 to 2024. In 2013 and 2019, the Arctic was seen as a “region in transition”. Climate change increased its “geopolitical, geo-economic and geocological significance” (2013), with “geocological significance” being listed first in the same way in 2019.⁷ In 2013, climate change is emphasized as a central challenge for the Arctic as well as Germany’s profile in polar research. However, it is also clear that Germany saw the importance of the Arctic both in terms of energy and raw material supplies and as a sales market for German technology.⁸ In 2019, climate change was the reason for the German government’s commitment.⁹ In 2024, the importance of the Arctic is no longer primarily the result of climate change, but the “geostrategic and geoeconomic” increase in importance is due to a changed “security environment.”¹⁰ What all guidelines have in common is that they emphasize a “comprehensive” Arctic policy (2024 and 2019) or “horizontal coherence” (2013, in the context of the EU).¹¹

Security policy

The biggest change in position in the 2024 guidelines is on the security significance of the Arctic. It is not, as assumed in the 2013 and 2019 guidelines, a conflict within the Arctic, for example, over territorial and resource claims, which leads to a spiral of repression and non-cooperative behaviour (2019) or to a geopolitical race (2013), but an event outside the Arctic, namely the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which changes the “security environment” (2024).¹² At the same time, Russia is held responsible for the loss of Arctic exceptionalism in 2024.¹³ In the 2024 guidelines, Arctic security is explicitly related to Germany, and the Arctic is seen for the first time as a no longer “isolated region” and “arena of geopolitical tensions.”¹⁴ The presence of Russia and China, including their military presence, is clearly stated, and Russia’s capabilities are assessed as a “strategic challenge.” It is expected that the geopolitical relevance of the Arctic will continue to increase and that resilience and hybrid threats will gain in importance.¹⁵ For the German government, this

means, among other things, closer cooperation with EU and NATO partners, more procurement cooperation, and military exercises in the region. Although a response to Russia and China has been announced, it remains unclear what form this will take.¹⁶ The commitment to alliance obligations and the reference of Arctic security to Germany were also mentioned in 2019, while in 2013 the reference was limited to “Europe’s security interests” and confidence building was still emphasized.¹⁷ All guidelines emphasize the goal of a free of conflict Arctic, the importance of multilateral cooperation, and the right to freedom of navigation.¹⁸

Rule-based order

There is much consistency in the commitment and dedication to the rules-based international order in the Arctic. The importance of the AC is emphasized in all three guidelines. In 2024, the Federal Government is also committed to preserving the AC, but emphasizes that there can be no “business as usual”; in 2019, “constructive cooperation” with all Arctic states was still welcomed. Since 2013, it has been emphasized that Germany wants to play an active role as an observer in the AC. Among other things, all guidelines reaffirm Germany’s support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Polar Code.¹⁹ The German government has tightened its position on the extraction of mineral resources outside national continental shelves and is calling for a binding environmental impact assessment (2024), whereas in 2013 and 2019, it was still in favour of a “legally-binding regulation.”²⁰

Climate, environmental, and nature conservation

There is also a great deal of continuity in Germany’s positions on climate, environmental protection, and nature conservation. In 2013, only the precautionary principle with liability principle and the need for “highest environmental standards” (2019 and 2024 as well) were emphasized,²¹ the German position has become much more differentiated since 2019. In 2019 and 2024, the Arctic was seen as integral to climate protection, and the precautionary principle and polluter pays principle were placed at the centre. What both versions of the guidelines have in common is the reduction of emissions at various levels and, thus, the recognition that German emissions affect the Arctic, as well as the desire to close gaps in climate monitoring, identify sources of pollution, and reduce waste generation.²² The harmfulness of black carbon emissions was also recognized (as early as 2013).²³ The Federal Government’s position on biodiversity was emphasized more strongly in 2024.²⁴

Research

The core of German involvement in the Arctic has al-

ways been seen as research.²⁵ The call to preserve the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)/the extended continental shelf of the coastal states for research was taken up in all three guidelines,²⁶ as was the declaration of the 2nd Arctic Science Ministerial Conference (2019 and 2024).²⁷ While cooperation with all Arctic countries was still emphasized in 2019,²⁸ the 2024 guidelines confirm that research cooperation with Russia is currently not possible. Instead, cooperation with like-minded partners is to be strengthened. Cooperation with Russia is only to be continued when the “conditions” are right again.²⁹ New in 2024 is the mention of interdisciplinarity in Arctic research.³⁰

Sustainable development

Germany’s view of the economic and sustainable development of the Arctic has changed significantly between 2013 and 2024. The 2013 guidelines emphasized the “great economic opportunities” in the Arctic, as well as the contribution of Arctic raw materials to Germany’s energy and raw materials supply.³¹ In 2019, economic development was barely addressed; in 2024, the Arctic will be recognized as an area for “sustainable economic development.”³² All three guidelines see potential for German technology sales.³³ While the 2019 guidelines expressed interest in Arctic natural gas and LNG,³⁴ the focus in 2024 will be on critical raw materials for the green transformation and resilience.³⁵ The importance of the circular economy is also emphasized in this context (2019 and 2024).³⁶ In 2024, the German government is also committed to developing “binding rules on the environmentally sound extraction of mining of raw materials on land and at sea” and to achieving national climate neutrality by 2045.³⁷ Since 2013, the German government has been advocating the designation of protected areas, albeit with the addition of “on land and at sea” in 2024.³⁸ The guidelines on sea routes, which were still actively campaigned for in 2013 and see “significant opportunities” in 2019 and 2024, are almost identical.³⁹ The same applies to sustainable tourism and support for the 2030 Agenda (2019 and 2024).⁴⁰ There is also consensus in all three guidelines on safe navigation, free and peaceful passage,⁴¹ and sustainable fishing.⁴²

Rights of the Indigenous Peoples

The 2024 guidelines do not contain a separate chapter on the rights of Indigenous peoples, but the German position was nevertheless strengthened. What all the guidelines have in common is that they recognize the change in the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples due to climate change, among other things,⁴³ and that their freedom and self-determination are respected.⁴⁴ In 2013, the German government was still committed to ensuring that resources are used “in a way that respects”

the Indigenous Peoples. In 2019, the land claims and participation of the Indigenous Peoples in economic development were emphasized, as well as conducting research in line with Indigenous interests, incorporating their knowledge and welcoming their position as an equal party in the AC.⁴⁵ In addition, “regional administrative and economic models” have been seen as the starting point since 2019.⁴⁶ The German position was made even clearer in the 2024 guidelines. The Indigenous Peoples knowledge is of “vital importance” in research, and their knowledge should be included from the outset. Indigenous partners are integrated as “equals,” and their interests are taken into account.⁴⁷ The German government is committed to shaping the sustainable development of the Arctic in cooperation and “in a way that respects indigenous rights and is in harmony with indigenous ways of life” To this end, it emphasizes the role of the Indigenous Peoples as a “key partner” that

is involved in all decisions affecting them and acts in accordance with the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169).⁴⁸

Media and scientific reception of the Arctic Guidelines 2024

Media reception

Overall, the national media reception of the new German Arctic guidelines was low. Compared to 2019, in particular, media interest has fallen sharply.⁴⁹ The articles often had a purely news character, i.e., they were reserved with analysis, opinion or commentary. It was widely reported that the German government wanted to expand its involvement in the Arctic.^{50 51 52} The “Berliner Zeitung” described individual keywords as “cryptic,” while the German government’s announced reaction to defend



Figure 1: The covers of the three Arctic guidelines from 2013, 2019 and 2024. They show the German research vessel “Polarstern” (2013 and 2024) and the Arctic sea ice (2019). The visual language of the guidelines was mentioned several times by the interviewed experts as important

the rules-based order in the Arctic remains “unclear” for the paper.⁵¹ Judging by the title, the “Münchener Merkur” sees the new Arctic guidelines as a “new tactic against Putin’s Russia,” as does the AFP.⁵²

Scientific reception

The Arctic guidelines have also received little attention from think tanks. The assessment of the security policy environment in the Arctic is shared,⁵³ and the German government’s response to this is supported by Wahden. However, Wahden calls for the Nordic states to be supported in preserving the AC and to prevent the militarization of the Arctic from becoming a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Cooperation with third countries should be made more difficult for Russia so that Russia cannot develop its Arctic territories economically and is “forced to the negotiating table.”⁵⁴ Gibdała does not see a move away from diplomacy as a central means of German Arctic policy, which she attributes to Germany’s status as a non-Arctic state. She sees Germany weakened in the future because the use of non-military means in the Arctic will decline, and Germany is not sufficiently militarily positioned. Furthermore, Gibdała lacks “specific instruments” to achieve its goals.⁵⁵ Gehrke and Wehrmann see research in the guidelines as a “multifunctional tool” that “states use to legitimize their role in Arctic policy.” They call for greater involvement of non-STEM disciplines in Arctic research.⁵⁶ The security policy focus of the guidelines is confirmed by expert surveys, according to which all states are focusing more strongly on security in the Arctic.⁵⁷ According to experts, Germany has the least economic interest in the Arctic of all the neighbouring countries, the EU and China.⁵⁸

Expert reception of the Arctic Guidelines 2024

In order to assess the reception of the Arctic Guidelines, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with national and international experts from think tanks, business, Indigenous peoples’ organizations, NGOs and the public sector. Experts from the coastal states of Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Norway, Sweden, and the USA were involved.

The basic evaluation of the Arctic Guidelines 2024 was positive. In this context, the security policy focus was mentioned positively on several occasions. In addition, the continuity or continuation of the guidelines in the other areas was noted several times, and the timing of publication was described as good. The clear language and structure of the guidelines and the selection of images were also positively emphasized. The image design was mentioned several times as important, as it would better represent Arctic life than in 2019, but the placement was occasionally criticized.

No focal point emerged in the criticism of the guidelines. There was some criticism that the guidelines lacked concrete operationalization and instruments, that increased cooperation with Arctic states was not emphasized, that Germany could generally become more active in Arctic policy and that the Arctic was considered ecologically sensitive. It was also occasionally mentioned that Germany lacked a strategic culture and that the Arctic was not a focus of German interest relative to other maritime locations.

Relevance and legitimacy for German Arctic engagement

All of the experts interviewed were aware of the publication of the guidelines. The fact that Germany has guidelines at all was emphasized positively several times. For the majority of interviewees, the relevance of the Arctic for Germany resulted from Germany’s influence on the Arctic as a non-isolated (eco)system, for example, in climate change and from Germany’s role in polar research. The increase in geopolitical importance and Germany’s role in the economic development of the Arctic were considered less relevant. The legitimacy of increased German involvement in the Arctic was overwhelmingly affirmed, albeit for a variety of different reasons, of which “research” was mentioned most frequently. It was mentioned several times that German involvement is legitimate as long as it does not overstep the boundaries of the national jurisdiction of the neighbouring states. The need to observe ethical principles that are developed by the Arctic states and the Arctic population was also mentioned. The experts repeatedly mentioned that Germany was not alone in having an interest in the Arctic and that, in principle, any state could have an interest in the Arctic. In some cases, a double standard vis-à-vis China was read into the guidelines because if German involvement in the Arctic is legitimate, so is Chinese involvement.

Thematic focus and prioritization

Almost all experts recognized the focus on security policy and described it as good or necessary. At the same time, this was not seen as the exclusive focus; the positions of the guidelines on climate, environmental and nature conservation, and Indigenous peoples’ rights were perceived positively, as was the fact that the new guidelines recognize the Arctic more strongly as a populated area. There was criticism that the geopolitical situation should not be overemphasized and that the Arctic population should be prioritized.

Security policy and governance

The fact that the research cooperation with Russia was terminated was largely seen as correct, partly with

reference to the identical decision of the international partners and the dual-use capability of research. However, it was demanded that Germany should support the gradual resumption of cooperation with Russia in the AC and respect the fact that the decision on cooperation with Russia in the AC lies with the members. While the AC was seen as functioning in some cases, others questioned whether Germany recognized that the AC no longer served as an effective cooperation instrument and that a successor organization might be necessary. Some questioned why there is no cooperation with Russia in the AC, whereas there is cooperation in the IMO. The response to this was that the AC is based on a consensus of norms, while the IMO is based on international law. When asked what a German response to Russia and China in the Arctic could look like, coordination with allies in the NATO context was mentioned several times. While some considered this to be sufficient, others called for more German involvement, but not necessarily in military terms; rather, multidimensional cooperation was advocated. It was also mentioned that Germany should make a better “offer” to the Arctic states than China. In this context, Germany’s position as a non-Arctic state was also mentioned, which would result in limited room for maneuver. It was agreed that the Arctic should no longer be regarded as a “isolated region,” that confidence-building measures should no longer be mentioned (as was the case in 2013), and that Russia should be held responsible for the end of Arctic exceptionalism, although it was noted from another side that Arctic exceptionalism was now taking on a more discreet form and had not ended completely.

Climate, environmental, and nature conservation

The German position on the mandatory review of deep-sea mining projects was rated as good, as was the emphasis on the precautionary and polluter-pays principles. With regard to the latter, however, it was noted that the polluters are difficult to determine and that the costs arising from the precautionary and polluter-pays principles should not be passed on to the Arctic population. It was asked several times whether Germany was sufficiently aware of its role in influencing the Arctic climate. In this context, the phase-out of Norwegian natural gas was also advocated. It was also noted that the change in the importance of security policy was no reason to scale back climate protection, that biodiversity was mentioned little in the guidelines, and that the terminology of the Global Biodiversity Framework was not taken up in the designation of protected areas.

Research

Research was seen as a real priority for Germany and highlighted as a sector in which cooperation was still possible, for example, in comparison to the economic

development of the Arctic. The position of preserving the EEZs of the Arctic countries for research is legitimate. The inclusion of the Indigenous Peoples was emphasized as integral; here, there could be an even clearer connection to the interests of the Indigenous Peoples, e.g., in the choice of research questions. The status of science diplomacy for Germany was questioned.

Sustainable development

When asked whether Germany recognizes the economic potential of the Arctic, it was noted that this is not recognized at all or only partially recognized (due to the long-term nature and difficult regulatory context). At the same time, it was argued that it was not the task of the guidelines to formulate a position on this. Potential for German involvement was not seen with regard to oil and gas but rather with (critical) raw materials, shipping, and fisheries. Germany’s focus on critical raw materials (important for green transition and resilience) was seen as understandable, but it was pointed out that the self-determination of the Arctic Peoples must be respected and that the Arctic should not be seen as a “mine.” In some cases, a clearer German position on sustainable development and greater economic engagement in the Arctic was expected, including advocating for Arctic potential in the EU or investing in mining. In some cases, Germany’s role was only seen as a “buyer” of raw materials. Some respondents noted that climate change would make resource extraction more difficult, not easier, and that the guidelines insinuate the latter incorrectly. The mention of “great opportunities” in connection with new shipping routes was considered understandable but, in some cases, also overemphasized. In this context, it was demanded that Germany should advocate for the further development of the Polar Code and the ban on heavy fuel oil. It was affirmed that Germany sufficiently respects the use of raw materials by Arctic states in their EEZ.

Respect for the rights of Indigenous Peoples

The German position on the inclusion of Indigenous peoples was considered appropriate. Germany should incorporate Indigenous knowledge into German research, respect the rights of Indigenous peoples in all areas, and understand the cross-border way of life of Indigenous peoples. It was also argued that Germany was in no position to violate the rights of Indigenous peoples. It was noted that a separate chapter, as in 2019, would have been good to keep the topic on the agenda. It was appreciated that UNDRIP and ILO 169 were mentioned, but it was not understood why the rights of Indigenous peoples were not mentioned under UNFCCC, CBD, and BBNJ. It was mentioned in a few cases that the EU sanctions against Russia had an impact on Indigenous peoples.

Outlook 2030

When asked which topics the experts would set in a hypothetical renewal of the guidelines in 2030, there was no consensus, except that the guidelines would depend on the political context. The desire for stronger cooperation with the Arctic states, a smaller role in security policy, and a focus on sea routes and navigation in the context of the melting ice were expressed several times. It was also suggested that the Arctic population be placed at the centre and that an annual review mechanism be incorporated, or at least that the reception of the guidelines in 2024 be taken into account.

Conclusion

In summary, the 2024 German Arctic Guidelines can be seen as a “further development” of the 2019 guidelines, with the greatest change in position being the recognition of the security dimension of the Arctic. Research and the sensitivity of the Arctic remain important topics in the guidelines, while sustainable development and the rights of the Indigenous Peoples are given even greater consideration than in 2019. While there was little media and scientific coverage, the experts’ evaluation was positive, with no clear criticism. However, there was consensus that any German Arctic policy would have to find its limits in the national jurisdiction of the Arctic states. Germany’s special role in the Arctic was frequently noted: as a non-Arctic country, but the third largest economic power with security interests, a dichotomy that is likely to shape German Arctic policy even more in the future than the new Arctic Guidelines.

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- 2 Lidia Gibadło, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines: Greater Focus on Security', OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 11 October 2024, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-10-11/germanys-arctic-policy-guidelines-greater-focus-security>.
- 3 German Federal Government, 'National Security Strategy: Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany', June 2023.
- 4 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 2024, 4, 30.
- 5 Auswärtiges Amt, 'Publikationen', Publikationen, accessed 13 January 2025, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/service/broschueren>.
- 6 This is particularly evident in the fact that the Arctic population, not just the indigenous population, is mentioned significantly more in the 2024 guidelines compared to 2019 and 2013. German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 28, 34, 40.
- 7 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 2013, 1; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 2019, 2.
- 8 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 6.
- 9 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 41.
- 10 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 11.
- 11 German Federal Government, 12; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 42; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 2.
- 12 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 23; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 11; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 15.
- 13 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 4.
- 14 The guidelines are somewhat unclear in this regard. While the "increased security threat from Russia's activities in the Arctic", which "affect German security interests", is emphasized at the beginning, the relevant chapter only mentions that German security is linked to security in other regions of the world; the Arctic is explicitly not mentioned. German Federal Government, 6, 11, 15.
- 15 German Federal Government, 15ff.
- 16 German Federal Government, 18.
- 17 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 23ff.; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 10.
- 18 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 15, 18; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 24f.; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 8, 10.
- 19 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 20-25; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 17-20; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 11-15.
- 20 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 25; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 19; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 11.
- 21 The liability principle only really comes clear in the German version of the guidelines and is missing in the English translation. German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 7.
- 22 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 11-15; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 27-33.
- 23 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 7; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 13; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 31.
- 24 For the first time, support for the BBNJ agreement is listed in 2024; independently of this, the Federal Government is committed to biodiversity within the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.
- 25 German research in the Arctic was described as "increasingly pressing" in 2019 and 2024, and as an area of "great importance" in 2013. German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 34; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 27; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 18.
- 26 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines.

Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 38; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 29; German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 9.

27 This includes the importance of Arctic observation and sharing of data and infrastructure, as well as developing an understanding of Arctic change, understanding the resilience of the Arctic environment and society, and strengthening Arctic resilience, environment and society. German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 37; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 28.

28 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 27.

29 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 34, 38.

30 German Federal Government, 37.

31 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 6.

32 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 28.

33 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 6; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 33; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 43.

34 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 34.

35 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 5.

36 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 34; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 46.

37 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 32, 46.

38 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 14; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 15,34; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 46.

39 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 8; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming

Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 33; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 43.

40 German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 31f.; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 41f.

41 Safer shipping also includes the expansion of maritime surveillance and sea rescue, which are emphasized in all three guidelines. German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 9; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 33; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 43, 45.

42 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 6; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 34; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 46.

43 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 11; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 37; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 28.

44 German Federal Foreign Office, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.', 11; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future', 38; German Federal Government, 'Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. Germany and the Arctic in the context of climate crisis and the Zeitenwende', 44.

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